Berle and the Entrepreneur
Charles R. T. O’Kelley†
I. INTRODUCTION
In the first and last four chapters (“the Five Chapters”) of The Modern Corporation and Private Property,1 Adolf Berle, Jr. describes in
sweeping terms a fundamental transformation of the American economy.2 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the dominant economic
actor was the sole proprietor, who owned and controlled all aspects of his
business. By the first quarter of the twentieth century, the “corporate
system,”3 and the few hundred large, quasi-public corporations of which
it was composed, had taken control of many sectors of American industry and promised in years to come to gain an increasingly larger share of
America’s economic wealth and power.4 Berle identified separation of
ownership from control as the central characteristic of the corporate system and its constituent corporations.5 Shareholders supplied the wealth
but none of the control. Managers exercised control but took none of the
risks. As a result, Berle asserted, one of the fundamental assumptions
underlying our system of private property no longer held true. In the
early nineteenth century, we believed that allowing the businessman to
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1. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 340–41 (MacMillan 1933).
2. Berle’s co-author was Gardiner Means. However, Berle is acknowledged as the principal
author and overall project director. See ADOLF A. BERLE, NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, 1918–1971,
FROM THE PAPERS OF ADOLF A. BERLE 20–21 (Beatrice Bishop Berle & Travis Beal Jacobs, eds.,
1973) [hereinafter BERLE, NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS]. The Five Chapters bear Berle’s unmistakable
mark, containing two themes that continued throughout the remainder of his career: an emphasis on
the problem of power and a focus on bringing the reality of America more in line with its ideology.
See infra notes 90–94, 107–123 and accompanying text.
3. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 1, 2–4.
4. Id. at 2–3, 10–19.
5. Id. at 4–7.
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use his property as he saw fit was socially efficient because, in the pursuit of maximum profit, each businessman would find it in his best interest to allocate resources effectively. In this early nineteenth century
world, the businessman was a sole proprietor—an entrepreneur—and he
owned and controlled the business. He took the consequences, good
(profits) or bad (losses), resulting from his operation of the business.6
Berle referred to this as “the traditional logic of profits.”7 But in the
world of the modern corporation Berle described, ownership and control
had been separated, undercutting the traditional logic of profits that had
justified the laissez-faire reliance on private property.8 This raised the
specter of the concentration of enormous power in the hands of a few
hundred captains of industry; uncontrolled by the profit motive or by the
shareholders, these captains of industry would inevitably take for themselves powers akin to that of princes to be used for ends of their own
choosing.9
Viewed from today, and through a lens dominated by the thinking
and ideology of neo-classical economists identified with the University
of Chicago,10 Berle’s critique appears in substantial part to claim that the
modern corporation is not operated as if by a classic entrepreneur with
the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth. So viewed, Berle’s critique
reduces to an empirical question: do the managers of the modern corporation make decisions substantially similar to those that would be made
by a true entrepreneur? If managers act substantially as would a true
owner/entrepreneur, and if the price a shareholder pays for her stock reflects the value of the expected efforts of the managers and not the value
of the effort that would be expected if the managers owned 100% of the
firm’s equity, then separation of ownership and control is an illusory
problem.
Writing more than ten years before Berle, another seminal scholar,
Frank Knight,11 addressed this empirical question. In Risk, Uncertainty
and Profit,12 Knight developed a theory of the entrepreneur as part of his
larger effort to more carefully explain the theoretical underpinnings of a
free-market economy.13 In this work, still considered the leading expli6. Id. at 8.
7. Id. at 33–44.
8. Id.
9. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 2, 354–55.
10. On the characteristics and nature of the “Chicago School of Economics,” see H. Laurence
Miller, Jr., On the “Chicago School of Economics,” 70 J. POL. ECON. 64 (1962).
11. Readers less familiar with Frank Knight may find useful biographical references infra,
notes 47–56 and accompanying text.
12. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (Houghton Mifflin 1921).
13. Frank Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty and Profit serves as an important bridge between classical and neo-classical economics and between an economics devoid of interest in the firm to the mod-
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cation of the role of the entrepreneur, Knight agreed with Berle that unification of ownership and control was essential to the proper functioning
of a free-market economy. However, Knight presented a compelling
argument that the modern corporation was controlled and operated by
one or more persons who managed the firm in a fashion similar to the
classical entrepreneur.14
By the time Berle began working on The Modern Corporation and
Private Property, Knight and Risk, Uncertainty and Profit were at the
center of debate about economic theory.15 Given Knight’s prominence
and the fact that Knight apparently reached dramatically different conclusions than did Berle concerning the consequences flowing from separation of ownership and control, it is initially surprising to discover that
Berle did not directly cite or acknowledge Knight or his work. However,
I will show that not only was Berle familiar with Knight’s work and
theories, but also that the Five Chapters can be read and understood as
intended, in part, as Berle’s response to Knight’s theories. This reading
of Berle is hidden from view by our misunderstanding of historical context.
More broadly, I will show that the lens of today results in a distorted view of what motivated Berle and what he was attempting to argue
and accomplish in his writing of The Modern Corporation and Private
Property. As Berle wrote the Five Chapters, he was increasingly stradern focus on developing a theory of the firm. Knight had two overarching goals. First, he sought to
bring coherence to the historic body of theoretical economics, thereby completing the classical economists’ perfect competition theory project. Knight explained that objective as follows:
The aim will be to bring out the content of the assumptions or hypotheses of the historic
body of economic thought, referred to by the classical writers as ‘natural price’ theory.
This is meant, not as the assumptions definitely in the minds of the classical economists,
but the assumptions necessary to define the conditions of perfect competition, at which
the classical thought was aimed, and which are significant as forming the limiting tendency of actual economic processes.
Id. at 18. Second, he sought to go beyond perfect competition theory to provide a coherent theory of
imperfect competition—how the free enterprise system actually works. Id. at 179–375. Central to
that task was an understanding of uncertainty and its consequences.
When uncertainty is present and the task of deciding what to do and how to do it takes the
ascendancy over that of execution, the internal organization of the productive groups is
no longer a matter of indifference or a mechanical detail. Centralization of this deciding
and controlling function is imperative, a process of ‘cephalization,’ such as has taken
place in the evolution of organic life, is inevitable, and for the same reasons as in the case
of biological evolution.
Id. at 268–69. In carrying out this sweeping agenda, Knight necessarily focused on the fundamental
nature of the economic system and the ways in which actual economic organizations—what Coase
later called firms—differ from the economic organizations that would exist under perfect competition. Id. at 264–312, 349–68.
14. Charles R. T. O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur and the Modern Corporation, 31 J. CORP. L.
753, 766–72 (2006).
15. See infra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
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dling the worlds of theory and practice. He and other public intellectuals
were struggling to overcome the prevailing myth of individualism that
blocked the road to a needed reshaping of the institution of private property and a needed adjustment in the national government’s economic
role. Berle saw himself playing a lead role in paving the way for what
was to become known as the New Deal. He saw The Modern Corporation and Private Property, and particularly the Five Chapters, as the centerpiece of a new interpretation of the myth of individualism; he envisioned the revised myth as the cornerstone upon which the New Deal
would be erected. To accomplish his myth-making goals, Berle chose to
identity the myth of individualism in the Five Chapters with the work of
Adam Smith, rather than the work of Frank Knight. I will explain why
Berle made this choice and explore the consequences.
The article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I summarize the standard reading of the Five Chapters, an interpretation that is distorted by a
failure to consider the context within which Berle wrote. In Part III, I
present a standard summary of Frank Knight’s free-market theories. In
Part IV, I address the question of how familiar Berle was with Knight’s
work. In Part V, I present an interpretation of the Five Chapters as a response to Frank Knight. I conclude with some observations concerning
perhaps surprising similarities in the views of Knight and Berle and provide a suggestion for how the collective research agenda of corporation
law scholars might be reoriented in order to deepen and enrich our ongoing study of the corporation, law, and society.
II. THE STANDARD READING OF THE FIVE CHAPTERS
In the Five Chapters,16 Adolf Berle paints a compelling account of
the death of an economic system dominated by the individual entrepreneur and the ascendancy of a new corporate system dominated by the
modern corporation and its faceless managers. The old, nineteenth century economic order featured numerous small firms, most of which were
owned by a sole proprietor. The governing economic and political ideology of this period—classic liberalism—idealized the individual and the
so-called “free-market” economy commonly identified with Adam
Smith’s “invisible hand.” Liberalism relegated government to the limited role of protecting the individual’s right to own private property
and use it in the pursuit of the individual’s self-interest. In the ideology
of free-market capitalism, individual consumers and producers govern
the economy. Each consumer and producer independently sends and
responds to price signals concerning available products and services.
16. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 1–9, 333–57.
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Each producer and consumer autonomously and freely calculates and
decides what to buy and sell. The result is the best possible allocation of
economic resources.17
On the production side of the equation, the central actor was the individual entrepreneur. She put at risk her wealth, dedicating it to the
ownership of the firm’s plant and machinery and to guaranteeing the
payment of monies promised to employees and other creditors. She also
put at risk her own human capital—her sweat equity—dedicating it to the
task of managing the firm. Her reward (at least if the venture was successful) was the firm’s profits.18
Unification of ownership and control in the individual entrepreneur
was the linchpin of free-market ideology, and it also served as the underlying justification for protecting the entrepreneur’s wealth and ownership
rights. Society as a whole, as well as persons working for the entrepreneur, could rationally believe that the entrepreneur, spurred by her desire
for personal gain, would make business decisions intended to achieve the
highest and best use of her business property. While some entrepreneurs
would succeed and others fail, the sum of all entrepreneurs’ business
judgments and actions would produce the best allocation of societal resources consistent with a free and just society.19
Berle’s claim was straightforward: the modern corporation and its
separation of ownership and control undermined the ideology of capitalism and the rationale for protecting private property in the means of production.
It has been assumed that, if the individual is protected in the right
both to use his own property as he sees fit and to receive the full
fruits of its use, his desire for personal gain, for profits, can be relied upon as an effective incentive to his efficient use of any industrial property he may possess.
In the quasi-public corporation, such an assumption no longer holds.
As we have seen, it is no longer the individual, himself, who uses
his wealth. Those in control of that wealth, and therefore in a position to secure industrial efficiency and produce profits, are no longer as owners entitled to the bulk of such profits. . . . The explosion
of the atom of property destroys the basis of the old assumption that
the quest for profits will spur the owner of industrial property to its
effective use.20

17. O’Kelley, supra note 14, at 757; infra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
18. KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 271–90.
19. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 340–41, 8–9.
20. Id. at 8–9.
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Under the standard reading of the Five Chapters, separation of
ownership and control adversely affects two groups: society as a whole
indirectly and shareholders directly.21 Society as a whole loses because
resources are not allocated to their highest and best use. Shareholders
lose because the corporation is not operated for their exclusive benefit:
It is traditional that a corporation should be run for the benefit of its
owners, the stockholders, and that to them should go any profits
which are distributed. We now know, however, that a control group
may hold the power to divert profits into their own pockets. There
is no longer any certainty that a corporation will in fact be run primarily in the interests of the stockholders.22

What is to be done about separation of ownership and control?
Berle sketched three possibilities. On the one hand, we could attempt to
make the traditional logic of profit work by bringing social and legal
pressure to bear “in an effort to insure corporate operation primarily in
the interests of the ‘owners’ . . . .”23 Alternatively, society could recognize the managerial control group as the new owners of the firm; the managerial control group would be entitled to exercise unfettered power
over the corporation and to receive the profits of the firm as an incentive
to ensure that resources were allocated to their highest and best use. The
third alternative was to subordinate the claims of both ownership and
control to the larger interests of society.24
The standard reading of the Five Chapters places heavy emphasis
on the assertion that the modern corporation is no longer being operated
for the exclusive benefit of the shareholders.25 If that problem could be
easily solved, then society would once again be able to rely on the traditional logic of profits and the institution of private property. So viewed,
it appears that Berle makes an empirical claim that separation of ownership and control has robbed society and shareholders of the benefits that
otherwise would accrue from the workings of the free-enterprise system.
From the standpoint of traditional microeconomic theory, it appears that
Berle is asserting that separation of ownership and control has resulted in
the replacement of the classic entrepreneur with a managerial control
21. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins:
Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 101 nn.4–5 (2008). Bratton and Wachter, however, develop a contextual and nuanced reading of Berle’s work, showing the evolution in
his thinking and the shifting historical context in which he thought and wrote. Id. They argue that
The Modern Corporation and Private Property reflected Berle’s views at the midpoint of his transformation from corporate lawyer to corporatist. Id. at 118–23.
22. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 333.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 333, 356.
25. Id. at 333.
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group that is not motivated by the traditional logic of profits. Finally,
Berle appears to believe that “fixing” the problem is not feasible.26 If
these empirical claims are false, then the problem of separation of ownership and control turns out to be “a tale . . . full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.”27
III. FRANK KNIGHT—THE ENTREPRENEUR STILL REIGNS WITHIN THE
MODERN CORPORATION
The standard account of the Five Chapters stands in stark contrast
to Frank Knight’s explanation of the role of the entrepreneur and the
phenomenon of separation of ownership and control. In Risk, Uncertainty and Profit,28 Knight developed a theory of the entrepreneur that ranks
even today as the seminal text on that subject.29 Knight’s account explained the unique, creative function played by the entrepreneur in dealing with uncertainty.30 Importantly, Knight identified unification of
ownership and control as central to the entrepreneur’s ability to function.31 However, unlike Berle, Knight argued that the modern corporation was operated as if by a classical entrepreneur.
Knight viewed “the entrepreneur system of organization, with production for the market impersonally, and concentration of direction” as
the defining characteristic of the real world free-enterprise system.32
Like Berle, Knight understood the role played by the prototypical entrepreneur—the sole proprietor. Indeed, Knight systematically modeled
that role, concluding that the entrepreneur carries out two key functions:
she manages—that is, she determines what products will be produced—
and she assumes the risk of her decisions—that is, she puts her personal
wealth at risk as a means of guaranteeing to her employees that even if
the venture fails, they will receive the compensation for which they bargained.33 In other words, the entrepreneur was not an individual who
simply charted a firm’s course in return for a salary. Rather, the entre26. Berle did not think the problem could be easily solved, if at all. See id. at 342–44.
27. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 5.
28. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit is the final version of Knight’s doctoral thesis, completed in
1916 while a graduate student at Cornell University. 1 FRANK H. KNIGHT & ROSS B. EMMETT,
SELECTED ESSAYS BY FRANK H. KNIGHT, at viii. (Ross B. Emmett, ed., Univ. of Chi. Press, 1999).
29. See S. Ramakrishna Velamuri & S. Venkataraman, Why Stakeholder and Stockholder
Theories are not Necessarily Contradictory: A Knightian Insight, 61 J. BUS. ETHICS 249, 251–62
(2005); Nicolai Juul Foss, More on Knight and the Theory of the Firm, 14 MANAGERIAL &
DECISION ECON. 269 (1993); Arthur H. Leigh, Frank H. Knight as Economic Theorist, 82 J. POL.
ECON. 578 (1974).
30. KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 264–76.
31. Id. at 349–53.
32. Id. at 351.
33. Id. at 270.
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preneur was the person who specialized in “responsible direction.”34 By
owning the firm, she put both her wealth and human capital at risk. Thereby, the entrepreneur was taking responsibility for her business judgments.
Like Berle, Knight understood that the modern corporation presented a phenomenon that must be woven into the fabric of the neoclassical account of the modern market economy, if that account were to
remain relevant.35 Knight acknowledged that the modern corporation
with its salaried manager and apparently powerless shareholders seemed
to be an institution in which ownership had been separated from control
and thus, an institution operating without an entrepreneur. Knight asserted, however, that an empirical analysis of actual corporations,
coupled with an understanding of the psychological make-up of entrepreneurs,36 would reveal that ownership and control remained effectively
unified in the modern corporation.37
Interestingly for corporation lawyers and scholars seeking insight
about the judicial abstention doctrine modernly termed the “business
judgment rule,” Knight believed that a proper understanding of the nature of business judgment would lead to a discovery that the modern corporation was actually managed and controlled by an approximation of
the classic entrepreneur.38
The first necessary step in understanding the distribution of control
and responsibility in modern business is to grasp this fact: What we
call ‘control’ consists mainly of selecting someone else to do the
‘controlling.’ Business judgment is chiefly judgment of men. We

34. Id. at 271.
35. Frank Knight understood that “[t]he typical form of business unit in the modern world is
the corporation. Its most important characteristic is the combination of diffused ownership with
concentrated control.” KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 291. Further, he noted:
Most [shareholders in the modern corporation] do not regard themselves and are not regarded as owners of the business. In form they are owners, but in substance they are
merely creditors, and both they and the insiders count upon the fact. The great companies are really owned by small groups of men who generally know each other’s personalities, motives and policies tolerably well.
Id. at 359.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 41–44.
37. KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 291–99. “The apparent separation between ownership and control turns out to be illusory.” Id. at 297. “Whenever we find an apparent separation between control
and uncertainty—bearing, examination will show that we’re confusing essentially routine activities
with real control.” Id. at 298.
38. I have argued elsewhere that Knight’s theory of the entrepreneur and what I call “entrepreneur primacy” provide a basis for understanding the business judgment rule and other important
corporation law cases and doctrines. See O’Kelley, supra note 14.
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know things by knowledge of men who know them and control
things in the same indirect way. . . .39
There is an apparent separation of the functions of making decisions
and taking the ‘risk’ of error in decisions. The separation appears
quite sharp in the case of the hired manager, as in a corporation,
where the man who makes decisions receives a fixed salary, taking
no ‘risk,’ and those who take the risk and receive profits—the
stockholders—make no decisions, exercise no control. Yet a little
examination in the light of the preceding discussion of indirect
knowledge and indirect responsibility will show that the separation
is illusory; when control is accurately defined and located, the functions of making decisions and assuming the responsibility for their
correctness will be found to be one and indivisible.40

Finally, Knight believed that the psychological make-up of the entrepreneur provided the ultimate assurance that the apparent separation of
ownership and control would not interfere with the operation of the corporation primarily for the benefit of the shareholders. “[Entrepreneurs]
are not the critical and hesitant individuals, but rather those with restless
energy, buoyant optimism, and large faith in things generally and themselves in particular . . . .”41 “Most human motives tend on scrutiny to
assimilate themselves to the game spirit. It is little matter, if any, what
we have set ourselves to do . . . . But once having set ourselves to
achieve some goal it becomes imperative to achieve it.”42 In Knight’s
view then, the typical entrepreneur sets a goal of pursuing maximum
profits for the corporation and its shareholders and pursues that goal as if
a game, with the boundless energy and enthusiasm that only a true entrepreneur possesses.43
For it is clear that the ‘personal’ interests which our rich and powerful businessmen work so hard to promote are not personal interests
at all . . . . The real motive is the desire to excel, to win at a game,
the biggest and most fascinating game yet invented, not excepting
even statecraft and war.44

Thus, Knight’s account presented for empirical testing the proposition that the entrepreneur still reigns within the modern corporation and
39. KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 291–92.
40. Id. at 293–94.
41. Id. at 366.
42. Id. at 53.
43. Berle accepted the possibility that the control within the modern corporation might be
properly motivated by a very small percentage of the firm’s profits. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1,
at 343–44.
44. KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 360.
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that the modern corporation is in fact operated primarily for the benefit
of the shareholders. It laid the groundwork for the voluminous contractarian accounts of the corporation birthed by law and economics scholars
in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the most important of which45
makes the case that shareholders and managers bargain for corporate governance rules ensuring that the modern corporation is operated primarily in the interest of shareholders.46 Thus, if one accepts Knight’s account, or the modern contractarian account, Berle’s identification of the
rise of the corporate system and the attendant separation of ownership
and control as a paradigm-shifting event seems to have missed the mark.
At most, separation of ownership and control (and the threat it poses to
the incentives provided by the profit motive) is a technical problem to be
solved by private contracting and appropriate government regulation of
the securities markets. However, it does not appear to represent or require a fundamental break with the laissez-faire system of private property and the individualist ideology associated therewith.
IV. BERLE’S FAMILIARITY WITH THE WORK OF FRANK KNIGHT
A surface reading of The Modern Corporation and Private Property discloses no direct citation to Frank Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty and
45. The foundational works in this regard are Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305 (1976); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288,
289–90 (1980).
46. Modernly, principal-agent theorists have argued persuasively that shareholders and managers do in fact contract for corporate governance systems that provide managers with strong incentives to operate the firm as would a true entrepreneur and that shareholders discount what they pay
for shares to reflect any residual loss that still can be expected to occur. Owner/managers who sell
shares to outsiders want to minimize the discount that purchasers will demand for anticipated shirking—actions taken that deviate from what the manager would do if he or she were still the owner of
100% of the business, and thus still fully motivated by the traditional desire to maximize profits.
Thus, managers voluntarily and in agreements with purchasers supplement the restraints provided by
corporation and securities laws with private-ordering mechanism designed to optimally minimize the
cost of anticipated future shirking. Whatever anticipated residual loss from shirking remains will
result in a corresponding reduction in the price at which the manager can sell shares to outsiders.
The most illuminating example is an initial public offering by a corporation sole. Before the public
offering, the sole shareholder is the sole residual claimant and will bear fully the impact of her nonshareholder-wealth-maximizing behavior as a manager. Thus, the owner can be expected to respond
as a classical entrepreneur in making resource allocation decisions. After selling a portion of her
shares, however, the former sole shareholder will only bear a portion of the cost of her nonshareholder-wealth-maximizing behavior as a manager. If the owner/manager could shift the cost of
such post-sale shirking to prospective shareholders, then separation of ownership and control would
be a serious problem. But she cannot, because the prospective purchaser will discount for the probability of such misconduct. Instead, the Seller willingly takes contractual steps to ensure prospective
purchasers that shirking will be optimally minimized and accordingly, that the manager will continue
to act similarly to a classical entrepreneur.
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Profit. However, a consideration of Berle’s intellectual connections with
academics in the field of economics, the prominence of Knight and his
work in those circles, and a careful read of the scholarly work Berle cited
in the Five Chapters, leaves no doubt that Berle was intimately familiar
with Knight’s work and his theories about the role of the entrepreneur.
Without question, “Knight was ‘the dominant intellectual in influence’ in the economics department at the University of Chicago [between
World War I and World War II], and, arguably the most important nonKeynesian American economist of his generation.”47 From 1917 to
1919, he taught at the University of Chicago as an instructor. After an
eight-year stint at the University of Iowa, he returned to the University of
Chicago in 1928, where he remained for twenty-five years.48 Knight and
his work, particularly Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, were at the center of
scholarly debate about the workings of the modern economy during the
1920s and early 1930s. For example, while a student at the London
School of Economics between 1929 and 1932, R.H. Coase worked on the
first draft of his seminal article, The Nature of the Firm.49 In the final
version of that article, Coase devoted more text to an analysis of Risk,
Uncertainty and Profit than to all of the other economic scholars he cited
combined.50 On the pervasiveness of Knight’s intellectual influence during his time at the London School of Economics, Coase later commented:
Knight’s ideas were so much in the air at LSE . . . . Everyone at
LSE referred to Risk, Uncertainty and Profit whether they had read
it or not.51
[Knight] was regarded at the London School of Economics as one
of the greatest of economists and his book, Risk, Uncertainty and
Profit, was closely studied by all serious students of economic
theory.52

47. KNIGHT & EMMETT, supra note 28, at vii (quoting George J. Stigler, Frank H. Knight, 3
THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 56 (John Eatwell, Murray Millgate & Peter
Newman eds., 1987)).
48. Id. at 323. “Knight returned to Chicago in 1928 to take up the chair left vacant by J.M.
Clark’s departure for Columbia University.” GEOFFREY M. HODGSON, THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: AGENCY, STRUCTURE, AND DARWINISM IN AMERICAN
INSTITUTIONALISM 323 (Routledge 2004).
49. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Meaning , 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG., 19, 20 (1988).
50. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). The article is nineteen full
pages in length, plus a line or two. Coase devotes more than six of those pages exclusively to
Knight and Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. Id. at 388, 392–95, 398–401.
51. Coase, supra note 49, at 20.
52. R.H. Coase, Law and Economics at Chicago, 36 J.L. & ECON. 239, 239 (1993).
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But Knight’s work during the time between the First World War
and the New Deal was not limited to his path-breaking book. Between
1920 and 1933, Knight published at least fifty-three articles and reviews.
During that period, Knight was heavily influenced by the work of Thorstein Veblen53 and deeply interested in developing his own version of institutional economics.54 Although today he is often, probably unfairly,
labeled a neo-classicist, such label relates to Frank Knight’s work occurring well after 1932. The Frank Knight who wrote and participated in
scholarly dialog in the pre-New Deal decade was as much an institutionalist as a neo-classicist and was a member of the elite mainstream of
academic economists, which group included in its number faculty members at both Harvard and Columbia with whom Berle had strong, direct
connections.55 Clearly anyone participating in debates within the field of
economics during the 1920s and early 1930s, and particularly anyone
involved in the scholarly life of the leading university departments of
economics, would be intimately familiar with Knight and his theory of
the entrepreneur.56
Berle fits the bill of someone who would have been expected to
know of Frank Knight and his work. Berle was intensely interested in
learning more about economics, particularly as it related to corporations.
His study of corporation law in the early 1920s showed him the limitation of seeking to understand the intricacies of business from the study of
appellate decisions. As he noted, “Corporate transactions and financial
methods are invariably some years ahead of court interpretations.”57 Accordingly, Berle created opportunities to mingle with and learn from
scholars in the field of economics. This effort led Berle “far afield; and
it resulted in two years’ traveling to the Graduate School of Business
Administration at Harvard, nominally for the purpose of teaching the
subject of corporation finance, but actually for the purpose of becoming
53. While an instructor at Chicago from 1918 to 1920, Knight “was an influential member of a
group that gathered together to read and discuss Thorstein Veblen’s works.” HODGSON, supra note
48, at 323.
54. KNIGHT & EMMETT, supra note 28, at xiii, xv.
55. Those closest to Berle included William Z. Ripley, Gardiner Means, and Rexford Tugwell,
all of whom, like Frank Knight, were institutionalists influenced by Thorsten Veblen. Thomas K.
McCraw, In Retrospect: Berle and Means, 18 REVS. AM. HIST. 578, 580 (1990); Rexford G. Tugwell, The New Deal: The Progressive Tradition, 3 W. POL. Q. 390, 406–10, 412, 423 (1950); Malcolm Rutherford, Institutional Economics: Then and Now, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 173, 179 (2001).
56. During the decade preceding the Great Depression as now, American university departments of economics had different emphases, with the most influential schools being institutionalism
and neo-classicism. Frank Knight and his work cut across these lines. See HODGSON, supra note
48, at 323–24; Ross Emmett, “Frank Knight, Max Weber, Chicago Economics, and Institutionalism,” in ROSS EMMETT, FRANK KNIGHT AND THE CHICAGO SCHOOL IN AMERICAN ECONOMICS 112123 (2009).
57. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE FINANCE vi (1928).

2010]

Berle and the Entrepreneur

1153

better acquainted with financial theory.”58 Berle used his time at Harvard well. While attending Harvard College, Berle had been a student of
William Z. Ripley, a prominent professor of economics. During his
teaching stint at Harvard, Berle renewed his relationship with Ripley,
who subsequently cited Berle’s work on corporate law in Ripley’s influential book, Main Street and Wall Street.59 Ripley was later influential in helping Berle obtain funding for the study-of-corporations project
that would culminate with the publication of The Modern Corporation
and Private Property.60 One thing led to another. The funding of the
study-of-corporations project led to Berle joining the faculty at Columbia
Law School and to his hiring of Gardiner Means, then a graduate student
in economics at Harvard, as a statistical and economics research assistant.61 Both Ripley and Means were institutionalists, strongly influenced
by Veblen.62 As Berle’s citations of Veblen show, Berle also was influenced by Veblen.63 Thus, through all of these associations and his own
institutionalist leanings,64 Berle was exposed to an environment similar
to that experienced by R.H. Coase at the London School of Economics—
an environment in which the work of Frank Knight took center stage.65
We are not left to surmise as to Berle’s familiarity with Frank
Knight’s work however. A careful reading of the footnotes in The Modern Corporation and Private Property tells the tale. Most of The Modern Corporation and Private Property is heavily footnoted. The Five
Chapters are starkly different; the footnotes are few, and only four scholars are directly cited. Three of the cited scholars—Adam Smith,66
58. Id. at vii.
59. Harwell Wells, The Birth of Corporate Governance, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1247 (2010).
See WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET 60, 92, 122 (1927).
60. BERLE, NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 2, at 20; Wells, supra note 59, text accompanying notes 226–29.
61. BERLE, NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 2, at 21.
62. Rexford G. Tugwell, The New Deal: The Progressive Tradition, 3 W. POL. Q. 390, 406–10,
412, 423 (1950); Malcolm Rutherford, Institutional Economics: Then and Now, 15 J. ECON. PERSP.
173, 179 (2001).
63. See infra notes 68, 71–74.
64. Richard S. Kirkendall, A.A. Berle, Jr. Student of the Corporation 1917–1932, 35 BUS.
HIST. REV. 43, 58 (1961); Rick Tilman, Apology and Ambiguity: Adolf Berle on Corporate Power, 8
J. ECON. ISSUES 111, 111 (1974) (“Adolf A. Berle, Jr . . . must be considered at least a first cousin of
institutional economists who compose the membership of the Association for Evolutionary Economics . . . . His critique of neoclassicism and his emphasis on the evolution of economic institutions is
markedly similar to that of other institutional economists of his generation.”).
65. On the environment at Columbia, see Malcolm Rutherford, Institutional Economics at
Columbia University, 36 HIST. POL. ECON. 31, 31–52 (2004). On the environment at Harvard, see
Valdemar Carlson, The Education of an Economist Before the Great Depression: Harvard’s Economics Department in the 1920’s, 27 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 101 (1968).
66. Adam Smith, author of the The Wealth of Nations (1776), is now, and was at time Berle
wrote, considered to be “the father of political economy.” Amy Hewes, Economic Myths, 4 SOC.
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Walther Rathenau,67 and Thorstein Veblen68 were and remain important
in the history of economic thought. By citing each of these scholars,
SERVICE REV. 23, 27 (1930). He was also identified with the “invisible hand” explanation of free
markets.
It was Adam Smith who first pointed out the fundamental role to be played by profits . . .
in a capitalist economy: each individual’s actions are motivated by the desire for gain.
Profits, that is, are the motive force behind economic decisions. Furthermore, the pursuit
of self-interest leads the individual by “an invisible hand” to promote social benefit from
which springs the conventional wisdom among orthodox economists that capitalist market economies function, theoretically, in a manner superior to planned socialist economies.
Mark Obrinsky, The Profit Profits, 3 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 491, 491 (1981).
67. Walther Rathenau was a German industrialist, politician, and social critic whose books and
pamphlets were widely read in the aftermath of World War I. W.O Henderson, Walther Rathenau:
A Pioneer of the Planned Economy, 4 ECON. HIST. REV. 98, 98–99 (1951). His work included a
detailed criticism of late capitalism that shared much in common with the work of Thorstein Veblen.
See WALTHER RATHENAU, IN DAYS TO COME, 25–128 (Eden & Cedar Paul, trans., 1921) [hereinafter RATHENAU, DAYS TO COME]. However, he is most remembered as the father of economic planning and the planned economy. Henderson, supra, at 98–108; Arnold Brecht, Walther Rathenau and
the German People, 10 J. POL. 20, 34 (1948). It seems likely that Berle viewed Rathenau as a kindred spirit on multiple levels. Both Berle and Rathenau had strict fathers who demanded excellence.
Both men had difficulty working with others and assumed leadership roles because of the strength of
their intellect, imagination, and capacity for hard work. Both men were that rare combination—
doers and dreamers. John McCarten, Profiles: Atlas with Ideas—Part II, NEW YORKER, Jan. 23,
1943, at 22–24 [hereinafter McCarten II]; Brecht, supra at 31; HARRY KESSLER, WALTHER
RATHENAU: HIS LIFE AND WORK, 7–8, 24 (Beston Press, 2008) (1928). “There is no intellectual in
the world to whom [Rathenau] would not have measured up in conversation or in writing.” Brecht,
supra at 36. Both men understood persecution. Berle, as an American of Germanic descent, felt its
sting while an undergraduate at Harvard during World War II, for failing to change his name or join
in anti-German manifestos. BERLE, NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS,supra note 2, at 5. Rathenau “often
complained that he was only ‘a second-class citizen’—unable in peacetime to aspire to the rank of
lieutenant in the Prussian army.” Henderson, supra at 102 (internal citation omitted). In 1922, while
serving as Germany’s foreign minister, Rathenau was assassinated solely because he was a Jew by
individuals who wrongly doubted his patriotism.
Brecht, supra; WALTHER RATHENAU,
INDUSTRIALIST, BANKER, INTELLECTUAL, AND POLITICIAN: NOTES AND DIARIES 1907–1922, at 10–
11 (Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann ed., Caroline Pinder Cracraft trans., Oxford 1985) (1967) [hereinafter RATHENAU, INDUSTRIALIST, BANKER, INTELLECTUAL, AND POLITICIAN]. It is likely that
the young Berle saw much of himself as he hoped to be in Rathenau, who in 1909 was described as
“one of ‘the 300 men, each knowing all the others, who together control the economic destiny of the
Continent.’” Henderson, supra at 98 n.4. Berle was largely to realize that hope as one of Roosevelt’s key advisors and confidants. In reflecting on the role that he and a handful of others played,
Berle later noted, “[i]rrespective of [history’s verdict as to our importance] we can comfort ourselves
with consciousness that high privilege and great good fortune allowed us to be among the many coworkers in a time of vast change.” BERLE, NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 2, at 115. In that
modest reflection, I imagine Adolf Berle saw himself as having successfully followed in the footsteps of Walther Rathenau.
68. Thorstein Veblen “was arguably the most original and penetrating economist and social
critic that the United States has produced.” RICK TILMAN, THORSTEIN VEBLEN AND HIS CRITICS,
1891–1963, at ix (Princeton 1992). At the time Berle wrote the Five Chapters, Veblen was acknowledged to be the father of American institutional economics. “Perhaps the critical question
which Veblen asked was, ‘Why is economics not an evolutionary science?’ The attempted answer
included, negatively, an attack upon the scientific validity of systematic economic theory as currently expounded and constructively, the outlines of an evolutionary and institutional explanation of
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Berle was, of course, signaling his awareness of the important bodies of
economic thought with which each man was associated. But, he was
signaling much more. The repeated citation69 and criticism of Adam
Smith placed Berle in the mainstream of scholars and business leaders
who viewed laissez-faire individualism as a doctrine unsuited for the
modern era.70 By citing Veblen,71 Berle paid tribute to the acknowledged
economic behavior.” Paul T. Homan, An Appraisal of Institutional Economics, 22 AM. ECON. REV.
10, 10 (1932). Moreover, it was already clear that Veblen had lived a life as a scholar and writer that
would be judged kindly by history. As noted in celebration of the 100th anniversary of Veblen’s
birth: “Some men effectively catch the drift of development and have a vision of things to come.
Such men become active forces in that very development and their names become landmarks and
turning points. Time alone is the final judge of a candidate’s right to inclusion in this select list.
For, Veblen, time has rendered its verdict . . . .” Joseph Dorfman, Source and Impact of Veblen, 48
AM. ECON. REV. 1, 1 (1958).
Like Veblen, Berle caught the drift of things to come. Veblen had near encyclopedic knowledge of western culture and command of several languages. Rick Tilman & Andrea Fontana, Italian Debate and Dialogue on Thorstein Veblen: The Evolution of Appreciation for His Contributions
Despite the Apathy of the Intelligentsia, 44 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 81, 88 (1985); RICK TILMAN,
THORSTEIN VEBLEN, JOHN DEWEY, C. WRIGHT MILLS AND THE GENERIC ENDS OF LIFE, 3–4 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2004).
Berle was not far behind. Like Berle, Veblen was deeply interested in understanding the modern corporation and its impact on society and, like Berle, Veblen saw corporate finance as the key to
understanding the imperatives of the emerging corporate system.
Despite their similarities of insight and intellect, Veblen and Berle had very dissimilar life
experiences. Berle was rooted in urban America and graduated from Harvard Law School at age
sixteen. He immediately entered the world of the power elite as a Wall Street lawyer, academic, and
public servant, and spent his life working with and near members of the power elite. John McCarten, Profiles: Atlas with Ideas—Part I, NEW YORKER, January 16, 1943 [hereinafter McCarten I].
Veblen was raised on farms in near isolation from American society. His parents had emigrated
from Norway ten years before Veblen’s birth. His father never learned English. Veblen had great
difficulty obtaining and keeping academic posts and lived much of his later life without formal employment. RICK TILMAN, THORSTEIN VEBLEN AND THE ENRICHMENT OF EVOLUTIONARY
NATURALISM 1–2 (2007). In sum, Veblen “was a loner and academic drifter.” Marc R. Tool, An
Institutionalist Legacy: Remarks upon Receipt of the Veblen-Commons Award, 23 J. ECON. ISSUES
327, 327 (1989). Despite Veblen’s inability to fit comfortably into elite society, he had an enormous
influence on those he taught, directly and indirectly.
69. The entirety of Book 4, Chapter 3, “The Inadequacy of Traditional Theory,” is devoted to a
critique of Adam Smith and the economic theories Berle attributed to Smith. See BERLE & MEANS,
supra note 1, at 345–51. Additionally, Berle cites Adam Smith and The Wealth of Nations on the
first page of Book 4, Chapter 2, “The Traditional Logic of Profits.” Id. at 340.
70. As the Great Depression deepened, American businessmen rapidly abandoned their resistance to government intervention. “By 1932 the American business community—or, at least, powerful elements in it—was moving fast towards ideas of central economic planning. The nation, said a
Vermonter, Ralph E. Flanders of the Jones and Lamson Machine Company, was approaching a new
stage in human development—’the self-conscious direction of the mechanism of economic and
social life to ends of general well-being. . . . American business, as Henry I. Harrison summed it up,
was coming to accept ‘the philosophy of a planned economy.’” ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE
CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER, 1919–1933, at 183 (1957).
71. The very first citation in The Modern Corporation and Private Property is to “Thorstein
Veblen, Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise, N.Y. 1923.” BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1,
at n. 1.
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patron saint of those seeking to transform America in the aftermath of the
Great Depression.72 These citations also indicated Berle’s agreement
with Veblen’s critique of late capitalism, including the significant role
played by corporate finance in the control of the modern corporation73
and the relationship between the modern corporation and the allocation
of power in society.74 By citing Rathenau,75 Berle showed his belief in
national economic planning, an idea championed by Rathenau both in
theory and practice.76 To readers having a deeper familiarity with Rathenau, Berle was also signaling his commitment to radical but incremental change,77 his belief that the modern corporation should be trans72. The extent of Veblen’s actual influence on the New Deal and its policies is debatable.
RICK TILMAN, THE INTELLECTUAL LEGACY OF THORSTEIN VEBLEN: UNRESOLVED ISSUES 199–232
(Praeger 1996). His status as patron saint of those who molded the New Deal, as well as those who
sought greater change, is not.
To the young American radicals of the 1930s, Thorstein Veblen was a kind of patron
saint. He was a home grown social theorist whose ironic thrusts at American capitalism
seemed to grow more relevant in the chaos of depression. Every shade of leftist opinion
could find something to admire in Veblen. . . . [M]any of his insights were common currency. Everybody was talking about “conspicuous consumption,” “captains of industry,”
“robber barons,” and even “pecuniary canons of taste.” Veblen’s odd but striking terminology provided many battle cries for the age.
George M. Fredrickson, Thorstein Veblen: The Last Viking, 11 AM. Q. 403, 403 (1959).
73. See Malcolm Rutherford, Veblen on Owners, Managers, and the Control of Industry, 12
HIST. POL. ECON. 434 (1980). Berle was likely drawn to this aspect of Veblen’s work as a byproduct of his own expertise in corporate finance. See also Forest G. Hill, Veblen, Berle and the
Modern Corporation, 26 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 279 (1967).
74. SIDNEY PLOTKIN, THORSTEIN VEBLEN AND THE REVIVAL OF FREE MARKET CAPITALSIM
171–72 (Janet Knoedler, Robert Prasch, Dell Champlin eds., 2007).
75. The second citation in The Modern Corporation and Private Property is to “Walther Rathenau, ‘Die Neue Wirtschaft’, Berlin, 1918,” BERLE AND MEANS, supra note 1, at n.2. Rathenau is
the only person referenced in the concluding chapter of the Five Chapters, entitled “The New Concept of the Corporation.” Rathenau is referred to in the text of the first page of the concluding chapter, with a citation to “‘Von Kommenden Dingen,’ Berlin, 1918, trans. By E. & C. Paul, (‘In Days to
Come’), London, 1921, pp. 120, 121.” See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 353.
76. W.O. Henderson, Walther Rathenau: A Pioneer of the Planned Economy, 4 ECON. HIST.
REV. 98 (1951). In terms of Bratton and Wachter’s reexamination of Berle, Bratton, and Wachter,
supra note 19, Berle may also have been signaling his corporatist leanings. Rathenau was a leading
proponent of corporatism, conceived of as a “perfectly tuned ‘post-competitive industrial order.’”
Diethelm Prowe, Economic Democracy in Post-World War II Germany: Corporatist Crisis Response, 1945-1948, 57 J. MODERN HIST. 451, 461 (1985) (citing CHARLES MAIER, RECASTING
BOURGEOIS EUROPE: STABILIZATION IN FRANCE, GERMANY, AND ITALY IN THE DECADE AFTER
WORLD WAR I, at 9–10 (Princeton, N.J. 1975)). See also RATHENAU, INDUSTRIALIST, BANKER,
INTELLECTUAL, AND POLITICIAN, supra note 65, at 26. There are numerous definitions of the term
“corporatism” and many different camps of corporatists. Given Berle’s citation of Rathenau, it is
interesting to see one author label Rathenau, Berle, and John Meynard Keynes as the leading members of the “technocratic, procapitalist reformism” wing of corporatism. Philippe C. Schmitter, Still
the Century of Corporatism?, 36 REV. POL. 85, 87 (1974).
77. Rathenau advocated equalization of wealth, income, and educational opportunity; elimination of the right of personal inheritance; and heavy taxation of wasteful and luxury consumption.
Henderson, supra note 65 at 104–105; RATHENAU, DAYS TO COME, supra note 67, at 111. Yet he
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formed rather than destroyed,78 and his commitment to the preservation
of America’s core political and social institutions.79
The fourth reference was to an article by S. H. Nerlove, Recent
Writings on Profits.80 Nerlove was unknown outside of academic circles.
He joined the economics faculty at the University of Chicago in 1922,
but when the department was split into economics and business administration, he joined the business side of the split.81 Nerlove was intimately
familiar with and favorably disposed to Berle’s corporation law scholarship, which he cited not only in Recent Writings on Profits but also in an
article published a year later, Insiders and Corporate Income Streams.82
The scholar to whom Nerlove devoted the most text in Recent Writings
on Profits was Frank Knight; the scholarly work to which Nerlove devoted the most text was Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty and Profit.83 The
propositions for which Nerlove cited Knight predominantly related to
Knight’s analysis of perfect and imperfect competition and the role of the
entrepreneur. By citing Nerlove, Berle was signaling his own familiarity
with Knight’s work, and giving clues as to how the Five Chapters could
be read as a response to Knight’s influential theories about the firm and
the entrepreneur.
was against radical implementation of such changes. “On the rare occasions when he joined in the
discussion of domestic economic problems as a member of the Reich Cabinet, he limited himself to
warning against panaceas and against radical breach with the economic past.” Brecht, supra note 67,
at 32. Rathenau’s belief in incrementalism flowed from his understanding that innovation and tradition are in constant tension, and each has strengths and weaknesses. Incremental progress was the
responsible way forward. RATHENAU, DAYS TO COME, supra note 67, at 104–107. As to the notion
that his proposed reforms would depopulate Germany of the strong and talented, Rathenau replied:
“The objection that the well-to-do will be supplied with a strong motive for emigration, is invalid.
For such institutions will only develop to the extent in which they are regarded as justifiable and
necessary; by slow degrees only will they reach their terminal form.” Id. at 114. Interestingly, Veblen was also an incrementalist. See Rick Tilman, Thorstein Veblen: Incrementalist and Utopian, 32
AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 155 (1973).
78. Berle sided with the New Dealers who saw the modern corporation and its bigness as a
necessary precondition to economic planning; he saw the efforts of the Brandeisians to break up the
big firms and return to an idyllic past as fundamental error. Both Rathnenau and Veblen agreed.
Rathenau saw the modern corporation, properly regulated, but operated by entrepreneurial executives, as an indispensable economic institution. RATHENAU, DAYS TO COME, supra note 67, at 119–
123.
79. Though Rathenau’s reform goals appeared socialistic, he rejected socialism. Henderson,
supra note 67, at 99 (“[Rathenau was] a far-seeing reformer who would have recast capitalist society
without introducing socialism.”).
80. S.H. Nerlove, Recent Writings on Profits, 2 J. BUS. U. CHI. 361 (1929).
81. Eric Ghysels & Marc Nerlove, The ET Interview: Professor Marc Nerlove, 9
ECONOMETRIC THEORY 117, 119 (1993).
82. S.H. Nerlove, Insiders and Corporate Income Streams, 5 ACCT. REV. 153 (1930).
83. Nerlove’s article is twenty-two pages in length. Specific textual reference to Frank Knight
and Risk, Uncertainty and Profit occur on eleven of those pages. See Nerlove, supra note 80, at
362–64, 366, 368–70, 372, 374–76. Implicit references occur throughout. Significant reference is
also made to the work of Maurice Dobb and C.J. Foreman.
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V. THE FIVE CHAPTERS AS A RESPONSE TO KNIGHT’S ECONOMIC
THEORY
A contextual interpretation suggests that a central purpose of the
Five Chapters was to refute the still prominent belief that society should
be organized on the basis of laissez-faire individualism and its extreme
protection of private property rights. As such, the Five Chapters were a
response to the then dominant account of how a free-market economy
optimally allocates economic resources: Frank Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty and Profit.84 However, Berle made the tactical choice to use Adam
Smith as a straw man and not to target Knight and Knight’s analysis.
Berle purported to be dissecting Adam Smith’s theories and pointing out
their shortcomings. In reality, he was asserting that even the most current microeconomic explanations of free markets failed as an account of
a world dominated by the modern corporation.85
I surmise that Berle did this for four reasons. First, Berle hoped
that The Modern Corporation and Private Property would be read widely by the educated general public, much as had been the case for his
mentor William Ripley’s book, Main Street and Wall Street.86 While
Knight and his work were then prominent in academic circles, Knight
was largely unknown to the educated general public. Attacking Adam
Smith would grab the attention of the educated general public,87 while
focusing on Knight would have been a pointless distraction. Second,
using Adam Smith as a straw man allowed Berle to avoid getting bogged
down in a heavily footnoted give and take with Knight, as had just happened in Berle’s “debate” with Merrick Dodd.88 Importantly, focusing
openly on Knight would have required Berle to deal directly with
Knight’s powerful account of the role played by the entrepreneur, even

84. G. J. Stigler, A Generalization of the Theory of Imperfect Competition, 19 J. FARM ECON.
707, 711 n. 8 (1937) (“For a more elaborate analysis of perfect competition, the classic treatment by
F. H. Knight’s, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921) should be consulted.”).
85. For a concise account of the transition from Adam Smith, through classical economists, to
Frank Knight’s analysis of both perfect and imperfect competition theory, see Stigler, supra note 84.
86. For an account of the popular impact of Main Street and Wall Street and Ripley’s related
articles, see Harwell Wells, The Birth of Corporate Governance, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1247
(2010).
87. Adam Smith made the perfect straw man because he and The Wealth of Nations had
achieved cult status with both experts and the educated general populous.
Adam Smith’s great treatise has taken, and retained a position which is unique. It has become a ‘classic’. It has, unlike the mass of economic writing, established itself in the affections of the layman as well as the expert; and, unlike the mass of economic writing also, it has exchanged the fading laurels of ephemeral renown for a crown of abiding glory.
L.L. Price, Adam Smith and his Relations to Recent Economics, 3 ECON. J. 239, 240 (1893).
88. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 21, at 122–30.
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within the modern corporation.89 Berle preferred to take on Knight by
scholarly sleight of hand. A standard account of laissez-faire economic
theory could be attributed to Adam Smith and described in simple, folklore-like terms the content of which would be easily digestible by
Berle’s target audience. Berle could then make his points in similar
sweeping terms. Third, Adam Smith was a central part of the myth of
individualism,90 and the myth of individualism was, in turn, the cornerstone of America’s laissez-faire system of economic governance.91
Berle’s goal was to paint a new myth that would support government
regulation of the modern corporation.92 Myth-making93 and focusing on
89. Knight has assigned the entrepreneur the central role in imperfect competition theory, that
of combating uncertainty. KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 264–76.
90. See C. Eric Mount, Jr., American Individualism Reconsidered, 22 REV. RELIGIOUS RES.
362, 365–66 (1981); Charles L. Griswold, Adam Smith: Conscience of Capitalism, 15 WILSON Q.
53, 53–54 (1991); Lars Udehn, The Changing Face of Methodological Individualism, 28 ANN. REV.
SOC. 479, 481–82 (2002).
91. For the classic account of how individualism came to control the hearts and minds of ordinary Americans from the founding of the Republic to the New Deal, see Rexford Tugwell, The New
Deal: The Rise of Business, Part II, 5 W. POL. Q. 483 (1952). For a more theoretical account, see
Rick Tilman, Durkheim and Veblen on the Social Nature of Individualism, 36 J. ECON. ISSUES 1104.
Property in the beginning had no existence save as an undifferentiated element of the social structure. . . . [U]nder what circumstances did some individuals attain such identity
and force of personality that property could be transferred from the collectivity to the single individual? Part of [Durkeheim and Veblen’s] answer is that this occurs through the
promulgation of the myth of the metaphysical prepotency of individuals and the promotion and acceptance of the myth of individualism by both self-serving individuals and the
underlying population.
Id. at 1107.
92. The Berle who wrote The Modern Corporation and Private Property was engaged with
other public intellectuals in a struggle to shape and define the myth that would form the backdrop for
the presidential election of 1932 and subsequent societal efforts to respond to the economic and
social catastrophe we call the Great Depression. Berle was that rare combination—a dreamer and a
pragmatist. Like others working in and around the seat of power, he knew that despite the objective
failure of classic liberalism and its extreme protections of the prerogatives of private property ownership, the myth of individualism still held sway in the hearts and minds of most Americans.
Change could occur only by molding a new myth that would support government regulation of business and the economy. We can see Berle’s efforts to develop this new myth begin to take shape in
The Modern Corporation and Private Property, but its contours are fleshed out in The New Individualism, a campaign speech that Berle authored for Franklin Delano Roosevelt and in a later article,
The New Deal and Economic Liberty. However, the new myth Berle and other progressives sought
to spin could not depart sharply from the entrenched myth of individualism.
[Americans] believed in individualism, in independence, in liberty, in high living standards, and in democracy. . . . They were sacred, although they had lost much of their
meaning through abuse. Individualism was invoked to escape caring for the indigent; independence was twisted to preclude union membership; liberty had its ironic modern definition in freedom for corporations; high living standards were expected to be achieved
on a wage that could be adjusted with no threat to profits. . . . Progressivism had come to
imply a differing from these interpretations; it meant really believing in individualism
and in liberty, not only for powerful newspaper proprietors, but for workingmen and farmers, too.
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the gritty details of Knight’s economic theory must have seemed incompatible projects to Berle. Finally, Berle’s goal was to show that microeconomic theory had no answer to the pressing problem of the day—the
Great Depression. Instead, the answer lay in government regulation. To
make that case, Berle needed a simple foil to show the inadequacy of
laissez-faire economic policies in the era of the modern corporation.
Adam Smith provided that foil, Knight did not.94
The economic theory Berle attributed to Adam Smith emphasized a
standard utilitarian approach to property rights—property rights should
be assigned so as to ensure the maximum benefit to society.95 Leaving
each individual free to use his human and physical productive property
as he saw fit, each man’s pursuit of pecuniary self-interest would result
in “the optimum satisfaction of human wants.”96 However, the modern
corporation had made the traditional theories inadequate. The separation
of ownership and control meant that there was no classic owner/entrepreneur to be motivated by potential profits. Accordingly, we
can no longer base our public policies and our property laws on the economic theories that worked for the world of the individual entrepreneur.97
It is here that Berle played his straw-man trump card. Not only is
the problem posed by separation of ownership and control endemic in the
modern corporation, it is a reality that even Adam Smith realized:

Rexford G. Tugwell, The New Deal: The Progressive Tradition, 3 W. POL. Q. 390, 400 (1950).
93. The difficulty in making new myths is amplified by the ease with which old myths are
reinforced. Berle was trying to bend this process to his ends.
Economics, like so many other disciplines, is plagued with myths. As lecturers and as
writers of textbooks, we perpetuate economic interpretations that are based not on the
original source material itself, but on an oral tradition that somehow becomes codified into common knowledge. . . . Often it may be that the creation of myths serves the convenience of a ruling school of thought. The straw men fabricated in economics are sufficient
to stock many revivals of The Wizard of Oz. By bolstering received wisdom, these myths
douse the flames of heretics. Perhaps more innocently, the inertia of ideas provide
myths, once established, with a longevity that could not be otherwise intentionally
gained.
Craig Freedman, The Economist as Mythmaker: Stigler’s Kinky Transformation, 29 J. ECON. ISSUES
175, 177–178 (1995).
94. However, if scholars in the field of economics had been Berle’s target, then Risk, Uncertainty and Profit would have been the appropriate foil.
The concept of perfect competition received its complete formulation in Frank Knight’s
Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921). It was the meticulous discussion in this work that
did most to drive home to economists generally the austere nature of the rigorously defined concept [of perfect competition] and so prepared the way for the widespread reaction against it in the 1930s.
George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL. ECON. 1, 11 (1957).
95. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 340.
96. Id. at 345.
97. Id. at 333–44.
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When Adam Smith talked of “enterprise,” he had in mind as the
typical unit the small individual business in which the owner, perhaps with the aid of a few apprentices or workers, labored to produce goods for market or to carry on commerce. Very emphatically
he repudiated the stock corporation as a business mechanism, holding that dispersed ownership made efficient operation impossible.
“The directors of such companies, . . .” he pointed out, “being the
manager rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot
well be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. . . . Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the
affairs of such a company.”98

The conclusion to be drawn from Adam Smith himself was obvious.
Yet when we speak of business enterprise today, we must have in
mind these very units which seemed to Adam Smith not to fit into
the principles which he was laying down for the conduct of economic activity. How then can we apply the concepts of Adam
Smith in discussing our modern economy?99

By this deft use of the Adam Smith straw man, Berle sought to
avoid a detailed analysis of the exact disease that infected laissez-faire
market theory. There was no need to take on Frank Knight’s empirical
argument that the modern corporation was governed as if by a classic
entrepreneur. If even Adam Smith, writing before the industrial revolution, acknowledged that a very early analog of the modern corporation
was an inherently unreliable vehicle for a free-market economy, then
what more was there to discuss?
While this device served Berle’s short-term ends well, it made
possible the substantial confusion that exists today as to exactly what
Berle believed and sought to achieve. The above-cited passage is often
interpreted today as showing that Adam Smith understood the agency
problems inherent in the relationship between shareholders and directors.
Berle’s reliance on this passage leaves him open to categorization as
someone who believed that the main problem with the modern corporation was separation of ownership and control and that separation of ownership and control was a problem because of the consequent lack of as-

98. Id. at 346 (quoting 2 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 229 (Everyman’s Library
ed.)).
99. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 346.
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surance that the modern corporation was being operated primarily in the
interests of the stockholders.100
Had Berle more directly and transparently confronted Frank Knight
and his work, a different picture of Berle’s work would have emerged. It
would be clear to present day readers that Berle viewed separation of
ownership and control as merely a symptom. Likewise, it would be clear
that Berle was not concerned that those in control of the corporation
would fail to make decisions as would a classic entrepreneur. Rather,
Berle believed that the disease plaguing the economy and society was the
inequality of power that existed between the controllers of the modern
corporation and the rest of society, most particularly workers.101
Frank Knight’s analysis of the free market system in Risk, Uncertainty and Profit would have been an ideal theoretical foil for Berle if his
goal had been to address a more academic audience, because Knight’s
work was an attempt “to isolate and define the essential characteristics of
free enterprise as a system or method of securing and directing cooperative effort in a social group.”102 As Knight too modestly summarized:
“There is little that is fundamentally new in this book. It represents an
attempt to state the essential principles of the conventional economic
doctrine more accurately, and to show their implications more clearly,
than has previously been done.”103 Thus, Knight set out not to write a
new and better myth of free markets, but to write a much more detailed
and accurate account of the assumptions and rules that were implicit in
the grand free-market theory that traced its origins to Adam Smith.

100. For example:
Eugene Fama and I have been working for several years to understand the characteristics
that give survival value to . . . organizations like large public corporations characterized
by separation of ‘ownership and control,’ or more precisely, separation of the decision
management and residual risk bearing functions. Scholars from Adam Smith [1776] to
Berle and Means [1932] have pointed out the inconsistency of interests between managers and outside stockholders and emphasized the costs these conflicts generate.
Michael C. Jensen, Organization Theory and Methodology, 58 ACCT. REV. 319, 328 (1983). See
also Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON.
301, 301 (1983) (“Our goal is to explain the survival of organizations characterized by separation of
‘ownership’ and ‘control’—a problem that has bothered students of corporations from Adam Smith
to Berle and Means . . . .”); Edward A. Dyl, Corporate Control and Management Compensation:
Evidence on the Agency Problem, 9 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 21, 21 (1988) (“The agency
problem caused by the separation of ownership and control in large corporations has been discussed
by numerous researchers interested in the corporate form of organization, ranging from the early
work of Adam Smith (1776) and Berle and Means (1932) . . . .”).
101. One of the symptoms of that disease, of course, was the allocation of rewards and resources in a socially harmful manner.
102. KNIGHT, supra note 12, at viii.
103. Id. at vii.
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Central to Knight’s more detailed account of a free-market economy was his description of the purpose of any economic system, be it
free-market, socialist, or communist. That purpose is the organization of
economic activity.
Organization is nearly synonymous with division of labor. In organized activity, individuals perform different tasks, and each enjoys
the fruits of the labor of others. The two fundamental problems of
organization are the assignment of tasks and the apportionment of
rewards.104
The first essential of the existing system is that it solves its two fundamental problems together, as one. It is individualistic; it apportions tasks through the apportionment of rewards; it is an automatic
system, in which the interrelations of individuals are determined by
self-seeking on the part of each. The foundation of the process is
the private ownership of productive resources—a synonym for individual freedom. . . . Modern society (on the economic side) is organized on the theory that the owners of productive resources will find
their best use and place them in it, because in that way they can procure the largest returns for themselves.105

To this point, Knight’s account seems similar to Berle’s recounting
of the Adam Smith model, with the only new detail Knight adds being
the identification of the fundamental task of economic system: the assignment of risk and reward. However, Knight then explained the criticality of how this task must be performed for the free-enterprise system
to function as theorized.
This system, therefore, involves the assumption that even in a complex organization the separate contribution of each separate productive agency can be identified, and that free competitive relations
tend to impute to each agency its specific contribution as its reward
for participation in productive activity. And to the extent that the
system works at all, that we have an economic order and not chaos,
this assumption must be justified.106

In the above cited passage lies the key assumption made by general
economic theory from Adam Smith to Frank Knight: the workings of the
free market will result in each worker receiving the value of his or her
contribution to the firm’s overall product, as such separate contribution
is determined by competitive market forces. In the early nineteenth century world for which Adam Smith’s economic theory seemed ideal, mar104. Id. at 55.
105. Id. at 56–57.
106. Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
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kets worked competitively and without structural inequality of bargaining power. Products were made by time-tested methods that had been in
existence for centuries. There was no concentration of productive property into a small number of hands. Consequently, what a worker could
expect to receive for her services in the market would in most cases be
perceived as a “fair” return for the value that she had contributed in the
creation of the product.
But the world Berle and his anticipated readers lived in was one in
which the laissez-faire economy, dominated by the modern corporation,
was perceived as failing to deliver the promised optimal allocation of
economic resources. On the production side of the economy, factories,
equipment, and men stood idle; industry seemed unable or unwilling to
use its capacity. On the supply side of the equation, workers were unemployed in unprecedented numbers,107 and those who were employed
earned a wage and worked in conditions that were widely viewed as unfair.108 This failing could not be addressed within traditional economic
theory, because allocating rewards efficiently was assumed to equate with
allocating them fairly.
The failure of the laissez-faire system and the modern corporation
to allocate rewards fairly was part of the disease Berle diagnosed, along
with the associated failure to fully use the country’s productive capacity.109 The two failures worked hand-in-hand. The underpayment and
poor treatment of workers created the chaos that Knight’s theory predicted would occur if the system did not fairly reward workers for their
contribution to the corporation’s product.110 Workers had little loyalty
107. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER, 1919–1933, at 167–71
(1957).
108. Id. at 113–16. In short, something was not right with America, and everyone sensed it.
Our peculiar history makes equality more real to us than to people in some other lands,
though this has become less true in the twentieth century because of the disappearance of
free land to which everyone had thought he could go and plant himself along with his
crops with some assurance of security. Those to whom the traditional alternative was no
longer open were learning the weakness of maintaining that such opportunity still existed
when, in fact, it did not. They still believed that it ought to be so; but they no longer pretended so consistently that it was so. The more fortunate folk found, to their concern,
that a deep unrest was pulsing through the less prosperous population. . . . Those who
were filled with this unrest were not seeking after strange philosophies. What they
wanted was what they had always been told they possessed. It had been drilled into them
from their earliest years that anyone who worked and saved could “make good”—that is,
could acquire competence and status. Through no fault of their own, and in spite of faithfully following all the copybook maxims, they were finding that they had no success.
Sometimes they had been swindled. And they were not liking it.
Rexford Tugwell, The New Deal: The Rise of Business, Part I, 5 W. POL. Q. 274, 280 (1952).
109. FREDRICK L. ALLEN, ONLY YESTERDAY: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE 1920’S, at 297–
98 (First Perennial Classics ed. 2000) (1931).
110. SCHLESINGER, supra note 107, at 159–60.
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and trust in their employers. Workers had little to spend and their lack of
security made them reluctant to spend what they had. The chronic underutilization of factories created a large number of unemployed who had
nothing at all to spend. The twin failures of under-compensation of
workers and underutilization of productive capacity reinforced each other, resulting in a deflationary spiral all too similar to economic conditions
experienced in America and Europe in the so-called “Great Recession”
that began in 2008.111
The standard account of the Five Chapters describes Berle as concerned about the separation of ownership and control and its negative
impact on stockholders.112 In fact, Berle viewed separation of ownership
and control as merely a symptom of the deeper problem—the concentration of power in a relatively few hands accomplished by the rise of the
modern corporation and the corporate system. While he had concern for
the misuse of that power to the detriment of stockholders’ reasonable
expectations, Berle had equal or greater concern for the detrimental effects experienced by workers, consumers, and society as a whole.
This point is made clearly in the final of the Five Chapters. Quoting Walther Rathenau, Berle describes the modern corporation as governmental in nature.113 “The depersonalization of ownership, the objectification of enterprise, the detachment of property from the possessor,
leads to a point where the enterprise becomes transformed into an institution which resembles the state in character.”114 Berle then describes the
essential problem posed by, or the disease afflicting, the modern corporation and the emerging corporate system.

111. See Tugwell, supra note 91.
The truth of this matter was beginning to make itself felt rather widely even before 1933.
People were beginning to understand that the so-called capitalist system could not continue to run as the capitalists were running it. It would simply slow down and stop. The
year 1929 had looked, to many of them, like the often predicted end of the world. The
abstraction and making inert of income had been ruinous. There had to be immediate,
complete connection between input and output, between goods turned out and purchasing
power with which to buy them. There were glaring difficulties which anyone could see.
Some income was abstracted by the nonproductive or spent in nonregenerative activities;
more was immobilized to provide security for favored groups; and some was being used
for wasteful competition which resulted in no social benefits. These leaks, running off
into stagnant, sometimes stinking pools were sufficient to stop everything occasionally,
and most of the time they prevented full activity. Only once in a while did a period occur
when wastes were stopped or when purchasing power was, for the moment, equal to productive power.
Id. at 498 (emphasis in original).
112. See supra text accompanying note 98.
113. RATHENAU, DAYS TO COME, supra note 67, at 121.
114. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 352 (quoting VON KOMMENDEN DINGEN, 121 (E. & C.
Paul, trans., Berlin 1921)).
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On the one hand, [the modern corporation] involves a concentration
of power in the economic field comparable to the concentration of
religious power in the mediaeval church or of political power in the
national state. On the other hand it involves the interrelation of a
wide diversity of economic interests—those of the “owners” who
supply capital, those of the workers who “create,” those of the consumers who give value to the products of enterprise, and above all
those of the control who wield power.
Such a great concentration of power and such a diversity of interest
raise the long-fought issue of power and its regulation—of interest
and its protection. A constant battle has been wielded between the
individuals wielding power, in whatever form, and the subjects of
that power. Just as there is a continuous desire for power, so also is
there a continuous desire to make that power the servant of the bulk
of the individuals it affects.115

In this passage, Berle reveals his true concern as it relates to
Knight’s analysis of the underpinnings of a free-market economy and the
entrepreneur’s role therein. Because of the structural imbalance of power between those who control the modern corporation and the other related interests, labor is not receiving its just rewards, consumers are not
receiving competitive prices, and society as a whole, including the unemployed, are not receiving the full utilization of the nation’s productive
property. The problem is not that those in control of the modern corporation will not ruthlessly pursue self-interest and profit. The problem is
that they will. Put in terms of Knight’s theory, the problem is not that
the modern corporation is not managed as if by a classic entrepreneur.
The problem is that it is. And the ultimate problem is that those in control of the modern corporation couple their selfish pursuit of profit with
overwhelming bargaining power. As a result, the control group causes
the modern corporation to expropriate a portion of the gains from trade
that fairly are attributable to the contributions of labor, consumers, and
society as a whole.
To Berle, the nature of the modern corporation’s “profits” and the
allocation of those profits are both critically important. The standard
account of the Five Chapters interprets Berle as asserting that the controllers within the modern corporation expropriate rewards that should be
allocated to the shareholders. However, this is a misreading of Berle. As
noted in the previous paragraph, Berle viewed the modern corporation’s
profits as made up in part of sums that should be paid to labor and in part
of sums that should benefit consumers in the form of lower prices. Con-

115. Id. at 352–53.
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trary to the standard account, Berle believed that stockholders shared in
the expropriated gains.
In The Modern Corporation and Private Property and related writings, Berle details the numerous legal loopholes and devices whereby the
control group pays itself a share of the corporation’s profits to the exclusion of the stockholders. But, importantly, the control group also pays
out a substantial portion of the corporation’s profits as dividends in
which all shareholders benefit pro rata. Moreover, the control group
shares pro rata with all stockholders the portion of the corporation’s
market capitalization that is attributable to expropriated profits. We can
now understand why Berle argued that stockholders should only be entitled to a “sufficient” share of profits.116 Berle suspected that noncontrolling stockholders as a group actually received more from sharing
a portion of the sums expropriated from workers, consumers, and society
as a whole, than they would have received from pro rata receipt of all
profits that would remain in a corporation that did not engage in expropriation at all. In other words, far from being a champion of shareholder
primacy, Berle suspected that the shareholders were actually net beneficiaries of the great concentrations of power within the modern corporation.
It is easy to forget that Berle wrote The Modern Corporation and
Private Property not as a matter of abstract theory, but at a time of extreme national crisis.117 His later works show that his concerns for corporate power were not limited to times of such crises.118 Nonetheless, his
primary concern was that of his immediate experience—a time of
enormous uncertainty and tremendous national and individual trauma
and suffering. As Berle wrote in the last of the Five Chapters, “in time
116. “[T]he security holder must be compensated if an enterprise is to raise new capital and
expand its activity just as the workers must be paid enough to insure the continued supplying of
labor and the taking of the risks involved in that labor and in the life based on it. But what if profits
can be made more than sufficient to keep the security holders satisfied, more than sufficient to induce new capital to come into the enterprise? Where is the social advantage in setting aside for the
security holder, profits in an amount greater than is sufficient to insure the continued supplying of
capital and taking of risk?” Id. at 342–43.
117. The tragedy of the Great Depression defies easy summarization; attempting to provide a
coherent account of an event that played out each day in the shattered lives of the vast majority of
Americans is a daunting literary and historical venture. For a compelling chronicle of the human
stories that make up the Great Depression, see T. H. WATKINS, THE HUNGRY YEARS: A NARRATIVE
HISTORY OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION IN AMERICA (Henry Holt 1999). Still, raw numbers give a
backdrop against which to understand the scale of the crisis and unfolding tragedy. “[Between 1929
and 1933] Gross National Product fell by 30 per cent, industrial production virtually halved and farm
prices fell by about 60 per cent. The construction industry was badly hit and investment fell dramatically. Unemployment rose from 3 per cent to around a quarter of the workforce.” FIONA VENN,
THE NEW DEAL 7 (Edinburgh University Press 1998).
118. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER (Harcourt Brace 1969).
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of depression, demands are constantly put forward that the men controlling the great economic organisms be made to accept responsibility for
the well-being of those who are subject to the organization.”119 And
what they should be made to do was accept “a program comprising fair
wages, security to employees, reasonable service to their public, and stabilization of business, all of which would divert a portion of the profits
from the owners of passive property.”120
Ultimately, of course, the cure for the disease that Berle and those
for whom he wrote experienced could not be found in microeconomic
theory. It could not be found in the entrepreneur’s self-interested pursuit
of profits.121 The answer lay in applying macroeconomic policies. Only
the government, through regulation, direct expenditures, and tax policy,
could take the necessary steps to stabilize employment, to provide economic support to those without work, and to stimulate demand during
cycles when the inherent nature of free markets produced curtailment in
employment and production.122
Knight fully agreed with Berle on this central point. Like Berle,
Knight saw that the real economy did not always work as envisioned by
microeconomic theory and that periodic imbalances could only be cured
by government intervention and macroeconomic theory. Moreover, he
expressed these views in 1923, well before the Great Depression awakened others to the failings of a pure laissez-faire market economy.
[A]s industry is organized under the competitive system, costs
which from the social standpoint are fixed may often be avoided by
the owner of the business when demand falls off, by simply leaving
the productive factors, especially labor, unemployed and allowing
their services to go to waste. . . . The industrial entrepreneur, who
buys from other entrepreneurs partial products of large value and
who hires productive services, especially labor, on short term contracts, can reduce his own costs, though not the real costs of the industry to society, by reducing output or shutting down. Undoubtedly, this fact goes far in explaining the phenomenon of the business
cycle, since it involves, as Professor Clark points out, a vicious cir119. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 353.
120. Id. at 356.
121. As to the possibility that the problem of unemployment could be solved by reliance on the
market and the voluntary action of business, Berle concluded, “I am inclined to doubt whether business will take up the slack by any process of exhortation. If it is profitable, it will do so; if it is unprofitable it will not.” Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The New Deal and Economic Liberty, 37 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 37, 46 (1935) [hereinafter Berle, New Deal and Economic Liberty].
122. As Berle summarized in his first memorandum to Franklin Roosevelt in May, 1932, “Both
as a matter of sound economics and decent humanity, an economic policy of the government ought
to be adopted toward the restoration of individual safety.” BERLE, NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra
note 2, at 33.
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cle; each curtailment reduces the demand from other products and
helps to force curtailment in other industries. . . . He has placed his
finger upon an inherent and far-reaching weakness in the competitive system as a method for social organization. It seems probable
that any provisions which promise to deal adequately with this disharmony and to iron out the disastrous fluctuations of industry must
carry us no inconsiderable way in the direction of socialism.123

In the end, the world views and theories of Berle and Knight, one a specialist in law, the other a specialist in economics, had much in common,
unlike the vast divide that often separates those writing today who claim
lineage to one or the other of these two intellectual giants.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is understandable why Berle chose not to directly engage the
work of Frank Knight, then dominant in the world of traditional economic theorists. But, had he done so, the resulting synthesis would have been
illuminating. Knight was no apologist for the free-enterprise system124
and took pains to alert readers of Risk, Uncertainty and Profit to that
fact. “The net result of the inquiry is by no means a defense of the existing order. On the contrary, it is probably to emphasize the defects of free
enterprise.”125 Moreover, like Berle,126 Knight believed that for all its
shortcomings, capitalism still held promise when compared to alternative
institutions.
The fundamental fact about society as a going concern is that it is
made up of individuals who are born and die and give place to others; and the fundamental fact about modern civilization is that it is
dependent upon the utilization of three great accumulating funds of
inheritance from the past, material goods and appliances, knowledge and skill, and morale. Besides the torch of life itself, the material wealth of the world, a technological system of vast and in123. Frank H. Knight, Economic Theory and Practice—Discussion, 13 AM. ECON. REV. 105,
106–07 (1923).
124. “Central to Knight’s disenchantment with liberalism was his understanding of the selfcontradictions inherent in liberalism. Intended to build on the value of individual differences and the
commitment to the search for truth and justice, liberalism was fine for a society that viewed its chief
problem as organizational efficiency for the purpose of satisfying given wants. But the most important social problems are the decisions as to what we should want and what rules to use for mutual
relationships, not those of organizational efficiency. For those problems, liberalism fails because the
only test it offers for choosing among competing solutions are public opinion and coercion. Liberalism, therefore, undermines the social discussion of changes in wants and laws which it is designed to
build upon.” KNIGHT & EMMETT, supra note 28, at xix. See also Angus Burgin, The Radical Conservatism of Frank H. Knight, 6 MODERN INTELL. HIST. 513, 513–538 (2009).
125. KNIGHT, supra note 12, at viii.
126. Berle, New Deal and Economic Liberty, supra note 121, at 45–46.
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creasing intricacy and the habituations which men for social life
must in some manner be carried forward to new individuals born
devoid of all these things as older individuals pass out. The existing
order, with the institutions of private property (in self as well as
goods), inheritance and bequest and parental responsibility, affords
one way for securing more or less tolerable results in grappling with
this problem. They are not ideal, nor even good; but candid consideration of the difficulties of radical transformation, especially in
view of our ignorance and disagreement as to what we want, suggest caution and humility in dealing with reconstructive proposals.127

It is interesting to contemplate how Berle might have set out his arguments and theories had he more directly engaged Knight and his theories. Each knew the other’s discipline well. Each had a powerful intellect. In the end, what separated Berle and Knight was not so much their
theories, but there interactions with the real world. While a dreamer and
a thinker, time and again Berle came down from the ivory tower of
theory to actively seek to mold the world into a better place.128 In contrast, Knight was the archetypal academic.129 A more transparent engagement by Berle of Knight’s work might have resulted in Berle presenting his own theories more clearly. Moreover, it might have provoked an actual dialog between Knight and Berle—a dialog that one can
imagine might have pushed the work of each man even more to the forefront of thinking about the modern corporation.
Looking to the future, what are the implications of rethinking traditional interpretations of foundational corporate law texts? One major
implication has come to occupy my thinking. Corporation law scholarship for the last three decades has been dominated by the Chicago-style
version of neo-classical microeconomic theory and the myth of individualism. To what extent has this dominance resulted from an ahistorical
127. KNIGHT, supra note 12, at 375.
128. McCarten II, supra note 67, at 28, 33; McCarten I, supra note 68, at 22, 26–30. The
following description of Walther Rathenau would have been equally apt if said of Berle: “[A]ll his
life he stood with one foot in Utopia and with the other in reality—the most stable stand, perhaps,
any man of genius can have, provided he knows at what time to put forward which foot. Walther
Rathenau seemed to know.” Brecht, supra note 67, at 31.
129. On Knight as a scholar’s scholar:
One great source of his influence was the purity of his devotion to the pursuit of knowledge. Frank Knight transmitted, to a degree I have never seen equaled, a sense of unreserved commitment to the truth. . . . This unswerving devotion to knowledge was exemplified and reinforced in its message to us by Knight’s way of life. He was not a consultant to great or small bodies, whether public or private; he did not ride the lecture circuit;
he did not seek a place in the popular press. He conducted himself as if the pursuit of
academic knowledge was a worthy full-time career for a first-class mind.
George J. Stigler, Frank Knight as Teacher, 81 J. POL. ECON. 518, 518–519 (1973).
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reading of Adolf Berle’s foundational work? To what extent does the
explanation lie in the fact that corporation law scholars’ understanding of
economics is derived largely and derivatively from the work of modern
economists, rather than being grounded upon a direct engagement with
the works of giants of the near past, including Frank Knight, Thorstein
Veblen, and Walther Rathnau? To what extent does the explanation lie
in a more general lack of historical knowledge that increasingly obscures
our understanding of theorists, like Berle, whom we continue to cite?
I do not know the answer to these questions, but I have come to believe that the road forward for the academy of corporation law scholars—if we wish to play a meaningful role in the evolution of the modern
corporation—will require a collective effort to recapture the past. The
road forward should include the widespread reconsideration of the transformation of American society caused by industrialization, the introduction of modern modes of power transmission, transportation, and communication, and the parallel rise in power of financial capital. Further,
the road forward must consider the role of mythology in shaping our governing institutions. Rather than searching for novel normative and descriptive accounts of the corporation, the road forward should be focused
on developing a theory of the modern firm grounded in historical reality,
and transparently built on the insights of the great giants who worked,
thought, and wrote as this transformation occurred.
The study of Adolf Berle would surely be a part of such project, as
would a study of Marx and Weber and Veblen. But other, now lesserknown but no less important, contributors to understanding corporations,
law, and society, including Knight, should be resuscitated for modern
audiences. The blueprint for future scholarship suggested by this article,
then, involves a significant reorientation. The road forward should include a sustained and humble collective effort to inform the present
about the largely forgotten past, so that corporation law scholarship is
broadened and enriched with a deeper understanding of law, economics,
and the nature of the modern corporation.

